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IN PURSUIT OF ORDERED LIBERTY:
BREACH OF THE PEACE IN CALIFORNIA
Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained
abuses.'
The common law offense known as breach of the peace has been
the focal point of considerable litigation in the past decade. 2 Breach
of the peace statutes have been deemed, in their literal terms, to criminalize activity protected by the First Amendment. Litigation resulting from this conflict has endeavored to bring the offense of breach of
the peace into harmony with the Constitution.
This note will examine the evolution of one such statute, California Penal Code section 415. It will first explore the common law
theory of breach of the peace as contained in the pre-1969 California
cases. It will next focus on the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which significantly altered the common law offense and will discuss how those decisions have been incorporated in the California
law. Finally, the note shall present a proposed statutory definition of
breach of the peace which would comply with constitutional limitations
while still remaining a flexible instrument for the preservation of the
public peace.
California Case Law Prior to 1969
Elements of Disturbing the Peace

California Penal Code section 415 was enacted in 18781 as a
codification of the existing common law crime of breach of the peace.4
The statute states:
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace or
quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise,
or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or threatening, traducing,
quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor . . ..
1. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
2. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland,
397 U.S. 564 (1970); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Garner v. Louisiana,
368 U.S. 157 (1961); In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 510 P.2d 1017, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1973), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 1959 (1974); In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d
767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
3. Cal. Code Amend. 1877-78, ch. 299, § 1, at 117.
4. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 98, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (1969), rev'd
sub nom., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (West 1970).
[290]
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The case law has delineated several elements which must be established for a successful prosecution under section 415. The first involves intent. The statute itself describes certain acts, any one of

which, if performed "maliciously and willfully," would constitute the
misdemeanor.' The term "maliciously" means intending the wrongfulness of the act,7 while "willfully" means intending to do -the act

regardless of its legality.8

Thus, the actor must knowingly perform

an act with the intent of causing a breach of -the peace. 9 As with
other crimes, intent can be inferred from the circumstances, as where

a speaker persists in inciting a crowd to the point of violence despite

repeated requests to desist.' 0

Second, the offending act must breach the peace of a person or
neighborhood. It has been held that the disturbance of a single person's peace is sufficient." Since the statute does not require that the
public peace be broken, section 415 has been held applicable to disturbances within private dwellings as well as to those in public places. 12
Third, the offending act must disrupt either public or private
order. As stated in Rees v. City of Palm Springs,' the purpose of
the breach of the peace statute is to protect members of society from
the occasional deviant who seeks to 4disturb "the peaceful pursuits of

private affairs by members of society.'1
Defining Breach of the Peace

The first California case to construe the offense, People v. An-

desonI5 defined it as "a disturbance of public order by any act of violence, or by any act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing
6. People v. Neal C. Oester, Inc., 154 Cal. App. 2d 888, 316 P.2d 784 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1957) (dictum).
7. Larne v. Davies, 8 Cal. App. 750, 753, 97 P. 903, 904 (1908); CAL. PEN.
CODE § 7(4) (West 1970).
8. Castro v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 701-02, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500, 520
(1970); People v. McCaughey, 261 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135, 67 Cal. Rptr. 683, 685
(1968); CAL. PEN. CODE § 7(1) (West 1970).
9. In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 619 n.4, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021 n.4, 108 Cal. Rptr.
465, 469 m.4 (1973).
10. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 971 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (dictum). See
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
11. See Ex parte Boynton, 1 Cal. App. 294, 82 P. 90 (1905); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 415 (West 1970).
12. People v. Vaughan, 65 Cal. App. 2d 844, 849-50, 150 P.2d 964, 967 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1944) (hotel); see Verdier v. Verdier, 152 Cal. App. 2d 348, 352,
313 P.2d 123, 126 (1957). But see People v. Hill, 60 Misc. 2d 277, 303 N.Y.S.2d
265, 269 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
13. 188 Cal. App. 2d 339, 10 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1961).
14. Id. at 345, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
15. 117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
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consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community."' Accordingly, for purposes of analysis, the prohibited aots can
be broken down into two categories: (1) an act which is either violent
or, while not violent itself, is likely to provoke violence in others; and
(2) a non-violent act which disturbs the peace and quiet of a community or person.
Violence, the gravamen of the first category, has been defined as
the threat or actual infliction of unjust or unwarranted force upon persons or things."' A threat need only be capable of inspiring fear of
physical harm to constitute violence."8 For example, in In re Bell,' 9
pickets had surrounded a car and forced it to stop. Even though the
car's occupants were neither harmed nor touched by the pickets, the
California Supreme Court held that the intimidation inherent in such a
situation was sufficient to be termed violence.2 °
The second category of prohibited activity, acts which disturb
the peace and tranquility of the community, has consistently eluded
precise definition. Indeed, one jurisdiction, using a common law description similar to California's, concluded that the offense was not susceptible of exact definition. 2 Nevertheless, the last California case to
employ the common law concept in construing section 415, People
v. Green,22 attempted to impose discernible contours on this category.
In Green, the defendants had entered a bank in a protest demonstration and interfered with its operation by refusing to move away from
teller windows, immobilizing patron lines, and obstructing passage to
and from the service areas. 23 The Appellate Department of the Superior Court upheld convictions for disturbing the peace, citing People
v. Anderson24 to the effect that the "public peace is disturbed when
the acts complained of disturb the public peace and tranquility enjoyed
by members of the community where good order reigns."25 Noting
16.

Id. at 767, 1 P.2d at 66; accord, People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 429, 64

N.E. 175, 177 (1902).
1969).

See generally R.

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW

399-401 (2d ed.

17. People v. Tollack, 105 Cal. App. 2d 169, 171, 233 P.2d 121, 122 (1951);
People v. McIlvain, 55 Cal. App. 2d 322, 328-29, 130 P.2d 131, 134 (1942); see People
v. Flummerfelt, 153 Cal. App. 2d 104, 106, 313 P.2d 912, 913 (1957).
18. Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor., Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971).
19. 19 Cal. 2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942).
20. Id. at 505, 122 P.2d at 32.
21. Compare State v. Edwards, 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961), rev'd sub.
nom., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), with People v. Green, 234 Cal.
App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1965).
22. 234 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1965).
23. Id. at 873, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
24. 117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
25. 234 Cal. App. 2d at 873, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
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that the defendants' actions did not have to be violent to fall within
the bounds of the statute,2 6 the court affirmed the convictions on evidence that the defendants' acts had annoyed, obstructed, disturbed and
interfered with the bank's patrons.2 7
As precedent for applying section 415 to the defendants' conduct,
the Green court relied upon a New York case, People v. Harvey.2 8
In Harvey the New York Court of Appeals construed a disorderly
conduct statute to -prohibit conduct which created "substantial interference with . . . the reasonable man."2 9 The court established an
objective standard for determining the point at which annoying conduct became criminal under a statute which the Green court considered
similar to section 415.30 Since the court in Green discussed other objective criteria, the citation of Harvey suggests that the Green court
contemplated the adoption of the Harvey test as a limitation upon the
broad language, used in earlier cases,3 1 to describe a disturbance of
the community's peace and tranquility. The court's opinion, however,
failed to include affirmative language to this effect.
The "substantial interference with the reasonable man" standard
of Harvey would avoid the criminalization of conduct which creates
minor inconveniences, but would, nonetheless, adhere -to the policy of
Rees v. City of Palm Springs.32 Such a standard would somewhat
limit the factfinder's discretion in determining whether the questioned
conduct constitutes a disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the
community3 3 and would impose the more familiar judicial criterion of
reasonableness.
Earlier cases, such as People v. Vaughan,34 relied on the literal
meaning of the phrase "disturbing the peace and tranquility." In
Vaughan, the defendants had entered a hotel early Sunday morning to
distribute religious literature and had awakened several occupants -by
pounding on their doors. They were convicted of disturbing the
26. Id.
27. Id. at 874, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 440; cf. Rees v. City of Palm Springs, 188 Cal.
App. 2d 339, 10 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1961); Chrisman v. Culinary Workers' Local 62, 46
Cal. App. 2d 129, 115 P.2d 553 (1941).
28. 307 N.Y. 588, 123 N.E.2d 81 (1954).
29. Id. at 592, 123 N.E.2d at 83; accord, State v. Petty, 24 Conn. Supp. 337,
344, 190 A.2d 502, 506 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1962); State v. Avnayim, 24 Conn. Supp.
7, 12, 185 A.2d 295 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1962).

30. 234 Cal. App. 2d 871, 875, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440.
31. E.g., People v. Vaughan, 65 Cal. App. 2d 844, 150 P.2d 964 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1944); People v. Anderson, 117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1931).
32. 188 Cal. App. 2d 339, 344-45, 10 Cal. Rptr. 386, 390 (1961).
33. Cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972); Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242, 262-63 (1937).
34. 65 Cal. App. 2d 844, 849, 150 P.2d 964, 967 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1944).
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peace by tumultuous and offensive conduct. 5 The appellate court, in
affirming the convictions, held that section 415 does not require that
the public peace be breached nor that the acts complained occur in a
public place.3 6 While the defendants' conduct was not violent and
could not be classified as tumultuous, 3 7 the court felt that it could be
reasonably described as offensive under the reasonable man standard. 38
The rude awakening of the hotel patrons, while not presenting a danger
of violence, was found by the court to be conduct which sufficiently
annoyed, disturbed the peace, and interfered with the activities of other
citizens as to constitute a breach of the peace.
The California law, as it developed through People v. Green,
emphasized this duality of approach: punishing not only conduct conducive to violence but also that tending to disturb -the peace and tranquility of others. The appellate courts did not apply any limiting construction to the latter category, even as they upheld the statute against
constitutional attacks for vagueness. 39 Section 415 retained the broad
language derived from its common law origin, even in the face of
United States Supreme Court decisions which had invalidated convictions under similar statutes.40 These later decisions, however, were
to form the basis for the judicial surgery on section 415 which began
in 1969.
Redefining the Breach of the Peace
The Application of First Amendment Rights
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech was applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Gitlow v. New York. 4 Subsequently, First Amendment principles were used to overturn state convictions under statutes
which had curtailed expressive activity. 42 The focal point of the
Court's analysis has been the language in these statutes pertaining to
disturbing the peace and tranquility of the community. The Court
has consistently found this phrase to be overbroad in that it encom35. Id. at 846, 150 P.2d at 965.
36. Id. at 850, 150 P.2d at 967.
37. Id.
38. Cf. People v. Beifuss, 22 Cal. App. 2d 755, 67 P.2d 411 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1937).
39. People v. Green, 234 Cal. App. 2d 871, 875, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438, 440 (1965);
People v. Vaughan, 65 Cal. App. 2d 844, 853, 150 P.2d 964, 969 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1944).
40. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
42. See cases cited note 2 supra.
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conduct protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free
passes 43
speech.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut4 4 the defendant had been convicted
under a statute interpreted by the state courts as a codification of the
tcommon law breach of the peace.4" The Court recognized that a
state has the power to restrict speech whenever -that speech creates a
"clear and present danger" to a substantial interest of the state. The
preservation of public order against the threat of immediate violence
was conceded to be the proper purpose of the breach of the peace
statute. However, the statute in Cantwell, defined as encompassing
activity which disturbed the peace and tranquility of citizens, was too
vague to delineate any substantial evil the state could legitimately prevent.4 ' The conviction rested upon a crime the elements of which
were too vaguely enunciated to inform the defendant of what was prohibited.
The broad scope of common law breach of the peace came under
further judicial scrutiny in Terminiello v. Chicago,47 where the defendant's inflammatory speech had subjected him to a conviction for
disorderly conduct. The state court had construed the offense to include any act -which tended to breach the peace, the latter phrase including all conduct which disturbed the peace and tranquility of the
public.48 The trial court had instructed the jury that this requirement
was satisfied if the act stirred people to anger, caused a condition of
unrest, or created a disturbance.49 Finding these instructions defective, the Supreme Court noted that speech sometimes serves its purpose to the fullest extent precisely when it arouses and angers people
and creates a condition of unrest. Accordingly, to restrict speech the
substantive evil the state seeks to prevent must rise far above "public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest."5 0 Since the statute permitted a
conviction for conduct which produced results protected by the right
of free speech, it was void to that extent. While the exercise of First
Amendment rights may be restricted in the face of an immediate
threat to a substantial interest of the state, in Terminiello the public
43. See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (194 9Q.
44. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
45. State v. Cantwell, 126 Conn. 1, 5, 8 A.2d 533, 536 (1939), rev'd sub nom.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
46. 310U.S.at311.
47. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948), rev'd, 337
48. City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill.
U.S. 1 (1949).
49. 337 U.S. at 3.
50. Id. at 4.
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inconvenience or annoyance was insufficient to justify a denial of free
speech.
In State v. Edwards5 the South Carolina Supreme Court had
held, in language very similar to that of the California court in People
v. Green,5 2 that a breach of the peace occurs when there is a violation
of the "tranquility enjoyed by citizens of a municipality . . . where
good order reigns among its members ....
,,5 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. South Carolina,4 the
Court found this passage to be similar to that used by the Illinois
court in the earlier case of Terminiello v. Chicago. 5 Under this
interpretation the South Carolina statute would allow convictions for
stirring people to anger and unrest."' As in Terminiello this language
covered activities privileged under the First Amendment and was,
thus, necessarily void as being constitutionally overbroad.5" The conviction was overturned.
One conclusion that can be drawn from the Supreme Court's
decisions in these cases is that the phrase proscribing conduct which
"disturbed the peace and tranquility of the community" is constitutionally infirm. The Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut determined that
such a categorization was too general and indefinite to define a substantive evil the state could prevent at the expense of freedom of
speech.58 The later cases of Terminiello v. Chicago and Edwards v.
South Carolina proceeded on the concept that to cause unrest or annoyance is a legitimate function of free speech. The resulting annoyance is an insufficient evil to justify a curtailment of First Amendment activity. Where disturbing the peace and tranquility is phrased
in terms of annoyance or incovenience, the phrase encompasses conduct protected by the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. 59
51.

239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961).

52. 234 Cal. App. 2d 871, 44 Cal. Rptr. 438 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1965).
53.
54.
55.

239 S.C. at 344, 123 S.E.2d at 249.
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
337 U.S. 1 (1949), cited in 372 U.S. 229, 238.

56. 372 U.S. at 238.
57.

Id.

58.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).

59. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). Perhaps the contrasting approaches can be compared by
noting that the Cantivell Court embraced the concept which became referred to as the
"void-for-vagueness doctrine." That is, a statute that does not give a person fair warning of what is prohibited denies due process of law. On the other hand, the Terminiello and Edwards cases seem to approach the problem from the perspective of the
"overbreadth doctrine." This principle operates where a statute criminalizes peaceful
conduct protected by constitutional guarantees. For a discussion of these two concepts

in relation to statutes controlling expressive activity see Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-17 (1972).

September 1974]

CALIFORNIA BREACH OF THE PEACE

A second conclusion that can be extracted -from the Supreme
Court's opinions is that the substantive evil the breach of the peace
seeks to prevent is violence, either in the act itself or as its likely outcome."0 When a phrase such as "disturbing the peace and tranquility
of the community" is removed from the common law breach of the
peace, the statute pertains only to violent acts or acts likely to cause
violence in others. The California courts have followed this approach,
by restricting the purview of section 415 only to acts which are violent
or likely to provoke violence in others.
Reconstruction in California
In People v. Cohen6 1 the California Court of Appeal made the
threat of violence the sine qua non of breach of the peace. The defendant had entered a courthouse wearing a jacket on which the words
"Fuck the Draft" were written. He was arrested and convicted of
disturbing the peace by tumultuous and offensive conduct. In affirming the conviction, the court said that a breach of the peace was not
committed without actual or threatened violence. 62 By deliberately
omitting language from earlier cases that included "disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the community," the court in effect exercised
judicial surgery on a portion of the common law definition of the
crime. The Cohen court's citation of People v. Andeson6 3 was limited
to -that portion of the Anderson opinion which proscribed acts of
violence or acts likely to provoke violence in others,64 omitting any
reference to the disturbing of the community's peace and tranquility.
Similarly, the court's approval of the breach of the peace definition
contained in People v. Green was limited to an excerpt concerning
non-violent acts which were likely to arouse others to violence. 65
The Cohen court omitted any reference to the language in Green
which affirmed a conviction for disturbing the peace -and tranquility
of others. As a result, by restricting section 415 to only those acts
which are violent or are likely to provoke violence in others, 66 the
Cohen court effected a clean break with the Anderson-Green line of
cases. Being the highest court in California to have construed section
415 at that time, the Cohen court's interpretation stood as the definitive construction of section 415.
60. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).

61. 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 98, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931).
1 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Id.
Id.; see Hoffman v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 621, 625, 83 Cal. Rptr.

747, 750 (1970).
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The Cohen court noted that the acts of the defendant were not
67
violent in nature and could not be classified as tumultuous conduct.
Nevertheless, because of its "tendency to incite" others to violence, the
conduct was deemed offensive. 68 Citing language from Cantwell v.
Connecticut,6" the court held that the defendant's conduct could be
punished if it was likely -to cause others -to resort to violence. Cohen,
however, placed the threshold of criminality further from actual violence than did Cantwell, which required that the danger of violence
be clear and present. Cohen required only that it be "reasonably foreseeable" that others might be incited to violence." ° The Cohen court
thus interpreted the focal words "likely" and "tendency to incite" to
mean only that violence be reasonably anticipated from the acts of the
defendant, rather than requiring an immediate threat of violence. 7 '
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the record indicated no real threat
of violence as a result of the defendant's activities, 72 the court found
the conviction warranted because it was reasonably foreseeable that
others might be incited to violence by the defendant's conduct.
On -appeal to the United States Supreme Court the California
7
court's decision was reversed in Cohen v. California.
1
While the California court based its conclusions on the conduct of the defendant in
marching through the courthouse with the offensive words on his
jacket, the Supreme Court viewed the conviction as resting upon the
asserted offensive quality of the words themselves.7 4 Thus, the Supreme Court felt the defendant was being punished for the content of
his language only, rather than for some form of non-verbal conduct. 75
76
Specifically described forms of conduct such as flag desecration
or picketing 77 can be proscribed on the basis of a legislative judgment
regarding the probable effects of the conduct.78 Offensive conduct
67.
68.
69.

1 Cal. App. 3d at 98, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
Id. at 100, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Id. at 98-99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506, quoting from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310

U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
70. 1 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.

71.
72.

Id. at 99, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Id. at 98, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 505.

73. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).

74.

Id. at 18; Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 420-21, 509 P.2d 497, 507,

107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 691 (1973).

75.

Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137

(1973).

76. United States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1972); Crosson v. Silver,
319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970) (dictum); People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923,
78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).

77.

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Simpson v. Municipal Court, 14 Cal.

App. 3d 591, 92 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971).
78. Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (D. Ariz. 1970); People v. Cow-

gill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 927, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1969);
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which disturbs the peace, on the other hand, only generically describes
the attributes of undefined acts which have a tendency to incite others
to violence. Whether such offensive conduct is criminal depends upon
the factual situation in each case, since the crucial factor is whether
that act at that time would have the likelihood of provoking violence
in others. While the California Court of Appeal had determined the
crucial point to be where violence is the reasonably foreseeable result
of the conduct, the United States Supreme Court found this standard
insufficient to protect First Amendment rights.
Prior to Cohen, the Supreme Court had consistently required that
convictions under statutes curtailing speech-related activity clearly show
a nexus between the questioned conduct and the particular result that
the statute intended to prevent. In Schenck v. United States79 and
Cantwell v. Connecticut,80 the Court required that evidence of expressive activity8 l show that a "clear and present danger" existed of
attaining the results which the statutes in those cases prohibited.8"
While the original formulation of "clear and present danger" has seemingly been transformed into a requirement of "imminency,"8 the concept of requiring an immediate threat to a substantial interest of the
state has remained.
4 reversed the deThe Supreme Court in Cohen v. California"
cision of the California Court of Appeal because the "reasonable foreseeability" test applied by the California court amounted to little more
than an apprehension that violence might result. Despite this general
pronouncement, the Cohen court did not define the limits of the First
Amendment in this context, nor did it pass on the constitutionality of
section 4 1 5 .Yc Shortly before the Supreme Court's decision in Cohen
v. California the California Supreme Court passed upon the constitutionality of section 415 for the first time and, in so doing, attempted
to articulate the constitutional limitations inherent in its application.
People v. Street, 20 N.Y.2d 231, 237, 229 N.E.2d 187, 191, 282 N.Y.S.2d 491, 496
(1967), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969);
cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940).
79. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
80. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
81. In Cantwell the defendant had played an anti-Catholic record on a phonograph; in Schenck the defendant had distributed handbills protesting conscription during
World War I.
82. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1942).
83. See text accompanying notes 117-22 infra.
84. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
85. In this situation the Court has indicated it lacks the power to do so. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969)
(Black, I., concurring).
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In In re Bushman,8" the California Supreme Court stated that
disturbing the peace is synonymous with a disruption of the public
order by acts that are violent or that tend to incite others to violence.
As support for this definition, the court cited People v. Cohen for its
interpretation of the tumultuous or offensive conduct section of section
415." v Having thus cited Cohen, the Bushman court would appear to
have approved the Cohen "tendency to incite" rationale. In another
part of the opinion, however, the Bushman court stated that section
415 prohibits offensive or tumultuous conduct only when the conduct
itself is violent or when it creates a clear and present danger that others
will engage in violence.88 This ambiguity in judicial standards caused
some confusion for the United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. California. Since a clear and present danger of violence requires a greater
degree of proximity 'to violence than does the "tendency to incite"
language as construed in People v. Cohen,8 9 the Supreme Court was
compelled to choose between the standards.
The majority of the Supreme Court justices interpreted the Bushman court's citation of the California Court of Appeal's opinion in
People v. Cohen as incorporating "tendency to incite" language. 90
Since they had rejected this language in their decision, the majority
saw no distinction between the court of appeal decision in People v.
Cohen and the more recent holding of the California Supreme Court
in Bushman. On the other hand, the dissent concentrated on the
articulation of a clear and present danger standard, appearing in a
later part of the Bushman opinion. Relying on this language, the dissent felt that Bushman, in creating a clear and present danger test,
was not incorporating the tendency to incite language in People v.
Cohen. The dissent suggested that the Cohen case be remanded to
the California Court of Appeal for a re-examination, in light of the
clear and present danger standard created in the intervening Bushman
decision. 9 1
One key passage in the Bushman decision was not mentioned by
either side in Cohen v. California. The Bushman court considered
the defendant's claim that his conduct was "symbolic speech" protected by the First Amendment unnecessary for the final resolution of
the case. The court stated that regardless of whether or not the defendant's acts were intended to be communicative, and thus entitled
86.
87.

1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
Id. at 773, 463 P.2d at 730, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 378, citing People v. Cohen,

1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 101, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508 (1970).
88. 1 Cal. 3d at 773, 463 P.2d at 731, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
89. See notes 68-72 & accompanying text supra.
90. 403 U.S. 15, 17 n.2 (1971).

91.

Id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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to First Amendment -protection,92 the same test would be -applied as
regards section 415. 93 Thus, in Bushman, the determination of criminal liability began not with the resolution of First Amendment claims
of privileged activity but with an examination of whether the defendant's acts created the requisite degree of danger.
While the court neither cited authority for its position nor expounded upon its rationale, its position appears to be an application
of the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth. 9 Under this theory,
a statute is overbroad on its face, and hence unconstitutional, when
its prohibitions sweep into areas of activity protected by the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.9 5 The vice of an overbroad statute lies in its inhibiting effect on those who wish to express
their views but who decline to do so because such conduct may be subject to criminal prosecution.9" Thus, an overbroad statute has a "chilling effect" on the exercise of the First Amendment rights of those who
do not wish to engage in criminal litigation in order to assert those
rights. 97 In recognition of this effect, courts have allowed those who
are involved in litigation under loosely drawn criminal statutes to challenge a statute as overbroad with respect to third parties not before the
court whose constitutionally protected activities may fall within the
literal bounds of the statute. 98 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,9 9
the petitioner was able to secure a declaratory judgment against a statute, even though constitutionally valid as to the facts in his case, 100
92. See Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 7 Cal. 3d 64, 496
P.2d 840, 101 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1972); In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 569, 446 P.2d
535, 539, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 659 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
93. 1 Cal. 3d at 774, 463 P.2d at 731, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
94. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 844 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OverbreadthDoctrine].
95. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972); Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967); see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Overbreadth Doctrine,supra note 94, at 835.
96. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see
Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967); Castro v. Superior Court,
9 Cal. App. 3d 675, 88 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1970).
97. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
98. Gooding v.Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 619-20 (1971) (White, L, dissenting); Scharf, Judicial Review and the
PoliticalQuestion: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 523 (1966).
99. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
100. The facts of the defendant's own conduct need not be before the court for
the defendant to challenge a statute for overbreadth. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 616 (1971); see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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because the statute could be applied improperly to others. 0 1 If the
law is found susceptible of improper application to third parties, it
may not be applied to the litigant until the rights of third parties are
protected by a limiting construction. 2
The categorizations of offensive conduct or loud or unusual noise
in California Penal Code section 415 are so loosely drawn as to be
susceptible to a charge of overbreadth. l0 ' Offensive conduct is not a
specifically defined form of conduct. The term merely denotes an
attribute of unspecified acts which have a tendency to provoke others to
violence.10 4 In that "offensive conduct" pertains to any act, the term
clearly covers offensive speech as well as conduct. 10 5 A conviction
for disturbing the peace by offensive conduct, however, can only be
successfully maintained under a statute which is constitutional in its
application to speech as well as to conduct. Expressive activity which
is deemed the equivalent of speech is entitled to the most comprehensive protection afforded by the First Amendment. 10
Non-verbal
"symbolic speech" is subjected to a less protective "balancing test";107
and conduct without communicative content receives no First Amendment protection. 0 8 Since section 415 is general in its application,
covering all the above forms of activity, phrases such as offensive conduct and loud noise must be defined so as to allow for First Amendment rights. Therefore, section 415 should be construed so as to reach
only that speech which exceeds the bounds of First Amendment pro101.
102.
U.S. 518
senting).
103.

378 U.S. 500, 510-11.
Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
(1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (White, J., disSee In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 617, 510 P.2d 1017, 1020, 108 Cal. Rptr.

465, 468 (1973); cf. Pritikin v. Thurman, 311 F. Supp. 1400 (S.D. Fla. 1970); People
v. Dominick, 68 Misc. 2d 425, 326 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1971).

But cf. Kovacs v. Cooper,

336 U.S. 77 (1949) ("loud and raucous noise" held not vague); Haggerty v. Associated
Farmers of California, 44 Cal. 2d 60, 279 P.2d 734 (1955) ("loud and raucous noise"
held not vague).
104. E.g., In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970);
Hoffman v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal. App. 3d 621, 83 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1970); People

v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969); see In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d
205, 223, 474 P.2d 992, 1004, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 36 (1970).
105. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767,
463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970); cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
106. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969); see United
States v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96, 109 (9th Cir. 1972) (Browning, J., dissenting).
107. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 616 (1969) (Fortas, J.,dissenting);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460, 465-66 (1950); cf. People v. Huss, 241 Cal. App. 2d 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. 56
(1966). See generally Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091 (1968).

108. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); see Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So.
2d 891 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 981 (1971); West v. State, 489 S.W.2d 597
(Tex. Crim. App. 1972).

September 1974]

CALIFORNIA BREACH OF THE PEACE

303

tections for expressive activity, which necessarily includes the lesser
safeguards accorded symbolic speech or non-communicative conduct.
To avoid overbreadth, these descriptive phrases should be defined in
accordance with a single criterion, applied to both communicative and
The Bushman court's reference to clear
non-communicative acts.'
and present danger indicates that it considered this standard to be the
test associated with speech and, hence, the sole standard to be applied
in judging the criminal liability under section 415. Because the clear
and present danger requirement connotes an immediate threat of violence before conduct becomes criminal, the Bushman decision represents a clear departure from the rationale of People v. Cohen, which
had required only that violence be reasonably foreseeable.
A Suggested Approach for Breach of the Peace
Clear and Present Danger: An Accurate Standard?
The Bushman court's usage of the clear and present danger
test is somewhat questionable as some legal scholars have contended
that this standard has been discarded by the United States Supreme
Court."' 10 As originally conceived by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States'-" clear and present danger had almost an evidentiary
purpose. 2 Where a conviction was obtained under a statute proscribing acts in non-speech terms and the evidence supporting the conviction rested on the defendant's speech or speech-related activity, the
prosecution had to prove that the defendant's speech created an immediate threat of bringing about the result the statute was drawn to
prevent." 18 The term Justice Holmes used to define the requisite degree of proximity was "clear and present danger." Subsequently, in
Dennis v. United States," 4 the Supreme Court used the same phrase
to sustain a conviction under a statute which specifically forbade certain
types of speech. The Court adopted the lower court's definition of
clear and present danger. As voiced by Judge Learned Hand:1 5 "In
each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil', dis109. See note 93 & accompanying text supra.
110. See generally Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance
in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970); Strong, Fifty Years of
"Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT.
REV. 41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Strong].
111. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
112. Strong, supra note 110, at 44.
113. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1942); see Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951).
114. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
115. Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
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counted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." 110 Under this formulation, the requisite degree of proximity to the substantive evil varies with the weight
the court assigns to the evil. Under this sliding scale approach, if the
evil is great, the danger need not be imminent.
Since the Dennis decision the Court has shied away from using
the clear and present danger test. 117 In Brandenburg v. Ohio,"8 the
Court ruled that the state may statutorily forbid the advocacy of violence only when such advocacy is directed to producing imminent violence and is likely to have just that effect. 1" 9 In concurring opinions
by Justices Black and Douglas, both members of the Court called for
the repudiation of the clear and present danger test. 120 However, the
majority opinion approvingly cited Dennis, though without mentioning
the clear and present danger rule. The Court again neglected to
state the clear and present danger litany in Cohen v. California. And
recently, the Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford 2 ' upheld a local
ordinance forbidding noise that tended to disrupt the peace and good
order of a school, reading it to apply only where there is an "imminent" danger of interference with the normal activity of the school.' 22
These cases suggest that the Court has abandoned the clear and present
danger formulation in favor of a standard that requires the substantive
evil to be imminent before First Amendment rights of speech are lost.
Despite this marked trend away from the clear and present danger test,
the California Supreme Court, as exemplified by the recent case of
In re Bozorg, 2 3 has continued to use the Holmesian test for purposes
of First Amendment guidance.
In re Bozorg
In Bozorg several hundred persons attending a protest rally at
San Francisco State College 12 4 had been arrested and convicted for
disturbing the peace. The California Supreme Court reversed the convictions. 125 In so doing, the court reaffirmed the Bushman holding
that the portion of section 415 dealing with disturbing the peace by
116.

341 U.S. at 510.

117. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FiRST
AMENDMENT

53 (1966).

See generally Strong, supra note 110, at 41-80.

118.
119.

395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Id. at 447.

120.

Id. at 449-57 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).

121.
122.

408 U.S. 104 (1972).
Id. at 111-12; cf. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).

123.

9 Cal. 3d 612, 510 P.2d 1017, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1973).

124.

This is now California State University at San Francisco.

125.

9 Cal. 3d at 625, 510 P.2d at 1025-26, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 473-74.
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tumultuous conduct proscribes only conduct that in itself is violent and
disruptive of public order.1 2 6 The court read the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cohen v. California2 7 to limit the phrase
"offensive conduct" to non-violent acts which create a clear and present
danger that violence will imminently erupt. 1 28 Finally, the court interpreted the portion of section 415 prohibiting loud or unusual noise
to apply in two situations: (1) where there is a clear and present
danger of imminent violence or (2) where the noise is a guise to disrupt lawful endeavors.' 2 9
The interpretation of Cohen v. California as requiring that offensive conduct create a clear and present danger of imminent violence
is somewhat mystifying. The Supreme Court in Cohen v. California
did not enunciate a constitutional standard for future prosecutions under section 415. The Court found that the tendency to incite guideline applied by the state court in People v. Cohen'3 0 was an insufficient protection for First Amendment rights.' 3' Furthermore, the use
of the term imminent in conjuntion with clear and present danger is
questionable. If the clear and present danger test is used in its original
connotation, it in itself implies a high degree of imminence. 132 Its
usage with the term imminent is, therefore, redundant. If the clear
and present danger refers to the Dennis standard, where the degree of
imminence required varies with the seriousness of the evil, the further
requirement of imminence is superfluous. The Dennis test is applied
in situations where the activity does not present an immediate threat
of accomplishing a substantive evil, but where a court feels that the
magnitude of the evil is so great as to justify a curtailment of First
Amendment freedoms. Where, however, the threat of an imminent
evil is a prerequisite, as Bozorg indicates, the application of a slidingscale approach to the problem is unnecessary. This definition was also
applied in Bozorg, however, to that part of section 415 dealing with
disturbing the peace by a loud or unusual noise.
The Bozorg case is apparently the first decision to define a loud
or unusual noise with respect to section 415. The phrase itself is
126. Id. at 618, 510 P.2d at 1020, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
127. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
128. 9 Cal. 3d at 618, 510 P.2d at 1020, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
129. Id. at 621, 510 P.2d at 1023, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
130. 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).
131. See note 85 & accompanying text supra.
132. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1942); Anniskette v. State, 489
P.2d 1012, 1014-15 (Alas. 1971). The use by the Bozorg court of "clear and present
danger of imminent violence" indicates a degree of confusion on its part as to the
proper standard. While the United States Supreme Court bad used "clear and present
danger" through Dennis v. United States and has seemingly gravitated towards the requirement of "imminency," the Court has never used both tests in conjunction with
each other.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

similar to offensive conduct in that both generally describe attributes
of unspecified conduct. Since noise is simply sound, a loud speech
could be a loud noise. The Bozorg court, however, distinguished between two types of loud noise depending on the presence or absence
of a communicative intent."' Depending on the category to which
the conduct is assigned, the defendant's conduct is subject to differing
standards. If his noise is intended to communicate ideas, it is protected by the First Amendment guarantees, and, accordingly, there
must be a clear and present danger of imminent violence before his
activity is a breach of the peace. On the other hand, if no substantial
effort is made to communicate, the use of a loud noise to disrupt a
lawful endeavor is held to be a breach of the peace, regardless of
whether or not a threat of imminent violence exists.
The Bozorg court's analysis seems analogous to that of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Colten v. Commonwealth.1 4 In Colten
the defendant had been convicted of disorderly conduct under a statute
forbidding certain conduct done "with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm."' 35 This language parallels the terminology which had been disapproved by the United States Supreme
Court in Edwards v. South Carolina."' The Kentucky court distinquished the Edwards decision by construing the Kentucky statute to
apply only in situations where the predominant intent of the defendant
was to cause public inconvenience or annoyance. The specified intent
existed where (1) no bona fide attempt to exercise a constitutional
right was made or (2) the interest advanced by the particular exercise
of a constitutional right was insignificant with respect to the inconvenience or annoyance caused by its exercise.' 37 By so interpreting
the statute, the court restricted its application only to situations where
the defendant was not engaged in substantial First Amendment activity. In instances where the defendant's conduct "falls far below
the level of minimum social value,""' the state's interest in preventing
133.
134.
135.

9 Cal. 3d at 621, 510 P.2d at 1022-23, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71.
467 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1971).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 437.016 (1973): (1) A person is guilty of disorderly con-

duct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof, he: (a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (b) Makes an unreasonable noise; or (c) In a public place uses
abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or (d) Without lawful authority, disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting or persons; or (e) Obstructs vehicular
or pedestrian traffic; or (f) Congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse; or (g) Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose.
136. 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963), citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4

(1949).
137.
138.

467 S.W.2d at 377.
Id.
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public inconvenience is deemed to outweigh the individual's interest in
self-expression. By contrast, whenever conduct presents a valid claim
to First Amendment protection, the proscribed statutory evil must rise
far above public inconvenience or alarm. 139 On appeal to the United
States Supreme Court,1 40 the state decision was affirmed on grounds
that the statute did not infringe upon constitutional rights. The Court
thought the statute would proscribe defendant's conduct only when the
individual's interest in expression was "miniscule" as compared to the
public1 41
interest in restraining such expression at the particular time and
place.
The Bozorg court's distinction between non-communicative and
communicative acts marks a departure from the Cohen-Bushman
cases in two significant respects. First, the Bushman and Cohen cases
limited the scope of section 415 only to acts of violence or acts that
were likely to incite others to violence. 4 ' The court in Bozorg, by
proscribing disruption of lawful endeavors, has created a second standard of disturbing the peace which includes acts which do not threaten
violence. Second, Bushman had declared that all offensive conduct
was to be judged by the same clear and present danger standard regardless of whether the acts were intended to communicate ideas or
not. 4 3 Bozorg, while reaffirming that holding insofar as it related to
offensive conduct, 4 4 rejected that reasoning with respect to the term
loud noise. The Bozorg court differentiated between communicative
and non-communicative conduct and delineated a separate and distinct test to be applied to each.' 45
This second departure from the Bushman rationale apparently
results from a dual classification of the cases involving expressive activity. The first class contains statutes construed to encompass only
acts which have no communicative value and, hence, are not protected by the First Amendment.14 6 This grouping includes activity in
which the content is not proper communication such as libel, 47 ob139. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
140. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
141. Id. at 111.
142. In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 773, 463 P.2d 727, 730, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375,
378 (1970); People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 102, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 508 (1969).
143. 1 Cal. 3d 767, 774, 463 P.2d 727, 731, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1970).
144. 9 Cal. 3d at 618, 510 P.2d at 1020, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
145. Id. at 621, 510 P.2d at 1021, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
146. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); West v. State, 489 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
147. E.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Smoot v. Fox, 353 F.2d
830 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 909 (1966); Anderson v. Dean, 354 F.
Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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and personal epithets, 1 49 and also conduct which lacks a

bona fide attempt to communicate.' 5° The rationale given for prohibiting the above-named conduct is that any slight social value to be
derived from such acts is outweighed by the social interest in preserving order or morality. 15 1 The second class contains statutes which
cover ostensibly protected communicative acts but which are construed
to apply only where the activity surpasses the bounds of protection afforded by the First Amendment. Thus, where the legislation involved
supresses expressive conduct only where a substantial state interest is in
fact threatened by the activity 52 or where, as a matter of legislative
judgment, certain conduct must give way to a compelling state interest,
the statute will be upheld. 15
The Bushman and Cohen cases had seemingly embraced the second classification by restricting the purview of section 415 only to
situations of imminent violence caused by offensive conduct, recognizing that offensive conduct may sometimes be communicative, and
hence protected by the First Amendment. 54 However, the Bozorg
court has adopted the first classification delineating within the term
"loud noise" those noises which are not intended to be communicative
and therefore not protected by the First Amendment. By such a construction, section 415 is defined to reach only unprotected conduct
that willfully disturbs others.' 55
148. E.g., Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); United States
v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Ky. 1973); United Artists Corp. v. Harris, 363
F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
149. Hess v. Indiana, 413 U.S. 105 (1973); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
150. E.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Hoffman v. Carson, 250 So.
2d 891 (Fla. 1971); City of Portland v. Dennington, 253 Ore. 289, 451 P.2d 111
(1969); West v. State, 489 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
151. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Papish v. University of Mo.,
410 U.S. 667 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
152. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 111 (1972); Wright v. City of
Montgomery, 406 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1969); In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d
727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970); see City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill. 2d 1, 253 N.E.2d
400 (1969).
153. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (courthouse picketing); Simpson v.
Municipal Court, 14 Cal. App. 3d 591, 92 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1971). See cases cited note
78 supra (flag burning).
154. See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 492, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); In re Bushman,
1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970); cf. Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972).
155. See note 11 & accompanying text supra.
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A New Standard

This note proposes, in light of the foregoing analysis, that the
term "disturbing the peace," as contained in section 415, be interpreted as follows: A breach of the peace is an act done with communicative intent which creates a threat of imminent violence, or an
act done without communicative intent which disrupts lawful endeavors. Such a definition carefully restricts the scope of the statute only
to acts which are not protected under First Amendment guarantees,
either because they lack communicative value or, where such value

exists, because the act oversteps the area protected by the First
Amendment and is subject to regulation in the face of a valid state

interest.
For an act to have the requisite communicative intent two elements are necessary. First, the actor must make a bona fide attempt150
to communicate material which is not intrinsically unprotected speech

such as libel, obscenity, or personal epithets.

Second, the actor's in-

terest in communicating at that particular time and place must not be

"miniscule" in comparison with the state's interest in restricting such
expressive activity.1 57 In other words, the actor's conduct must not
be unreasonable in light of the competing interests of society and the
individual.15 8 Whether or not the individual's interest is of such im-

portance as to warrant constitutional protection is a matter of law to
be decided by the judge. 59
In circumstances where the conduct lacks the requisite communicative intent, the act disturbs the peace when, in the words of the
Bozorg court, it "disrupts lawful endeavors."' 1 60 California courts have
construed similar phrases to require that the activity in question sub-

stantially interfere with normal activities.' 61 For example, in In re
156. In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 619, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465,
469 (1973); cf. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 906 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
157. See, e.g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972); In re Bozorg, 9 Cal.
3d 612, 619, 510 P.2d 1017, 1021, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465, 469 (1973); Note, Symbolic
Conduct, 68 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1091, 1109 (1968); cf. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
158. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); cf. City of Portland v. Dennington, 253 Ore. 289, 451 P.2d 111 (1969).
159. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513 (1951); Crownover v.
Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 426-27, 509 P.2d 497, 511, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 695 (1973);
Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 908-10, 383 P.2d 152, 157-58, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800,
805-06 (1963); City of Portland v. Dennington, 253 Ore. 289, 292, 451 P.2d 111, 113
(1969); cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
160. 9 Cal. 3d at 621, 510 P.2d at 1023, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
161. See, e.g., Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1973); In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970);
People v. Cruz, 25 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 101 Cal. Rptr. 711 (App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1972).
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Kay,'62 the court interpreted a statute forbidding the disturbance of a
meeting or assembly' 63 to proscribe activity which substantially impaired the effective conduct of the meeting.164 Thus, under the proposed definition, the non-communicative act in question must substantially interfere with the normal affairs of citizens.' 65
The court in Bozorg applied the distinction between communicative and non-communicative acts to the portion of section 415 dealing
with loud noises only. It seems, however, that a similar analysis should
be attempted with the term "offensive conduct." Under the current
rule, all offensive conduct is non-criminal until it creates a clear and
present danger of imminent violence.' 66 Thus, offensive conduct
which has no social value, such as personal epithets, receives the same
protection as conduct is a legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights, 6 7 a result not dictated by constitutional principles. Under the
standard proposed by this note, such non-communicative conduct could
be prohibited where it constituted, essentially, a substantial nuisance."' 6 8 To adopt such an interpretation would be to overrule Bozorg and Bushman to the extent that they define offensive conduct. As
noted earlier, however, the reliance by the Bozorg court on Cohen v.
California for the requirement of a clear and present danger of imminent violence seems misplaced. 69 The analysis of Bozorg as to noncommunicative loud noises seems to undercut the rationale of the Bushman decision, which had refused to distinguish between communicative
and non-communicative conduct.' 7 ) The position of Bushman to this
effect now seems untenable in light of the subsequent decision in Bozorg.
Conclusion
The common law offense of breach of the peace criminalized
many forms of conduct now recognized as protected by the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech.' 7' Through a judicial
162.

163.
164.

1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1970).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 403 (West 1970).

1 Cal. 3d at 942-43, 464 P.2d at 149-50, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 693-94.

165. See notes 33-34 & accompanying text supra.
166. In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 510 P.2d 1017, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1970); In
re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970); In re Bushman, 1 Cal.
3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1970).
167. See cases cited note 166 supra.
168. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 909 (1972) (Powell, J., dissent-

ing); Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
169.
170.

See notes 85, 130-32 & accompanying text supra.
1 Cal. 3d 767, 774, 463 P.2d 727, 731, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1970).

171.

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1962); Cantwell v. Connecti-

cut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940); In re Bozorg, 9 Cal. 3d 612, 617, 510 P.2d 1017, 1020,
108 Cal. Rptr. 465, 468 (1973); see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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process of restrictive interpretation, the California courts have avoided
finding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. 7 2 Recently, however, in In re Bozeorg,17 3 the California Supreme Court rendered a
somewhat inconsistent construction of the breach of the peace statute.
Whereas earlier cases had decided that the communicative value of the
conduct was not a factor relevant to the finding of offensive conduct,
the Bozorg court arrived at a contrary result regarding loud noises.
According to the Bozorg decision, when an activity lacks communicative value a loud noise
need only to disrupt lawful endeavors to be a
1 74
breach of the peace.
This note has proposed reconciling the conflicting views represented by the Bushman and Bozorg opinions by extending the dualstandard approach created in Bozorg to the term "offensive conduct."
This approach, it is submitted, is more consonant with constitutional
principles of free speech and the practical necessities of preserving
public order. By restricting the purview of the statute to conduct
not protected by the First Amendment, the definition proposed herein
reflects the paramount importance given to the interchange of ideas in
our society.1 75 Nevertheless, it also recognizes the legitimate concern
of the state in protecting its citizens from unreasonable interference
where the interest of the actor in self-expression is negligible. The
'application of this standard will allow section 415 to be a flexible and
effective instrument for preserving public order without creating undesirable restraints on freedom of expression.
Eric G. Wallis*
172. Where a statute is capable of a meaning consistent with constitutional requirements by a fair and reasonable interpretation, it will be given that meaning rather
than one in conflict with the Constitution. County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal.
2d 349, 353, 55 P.2d 206, 207 (1936); People v. Cowgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 926,
78 Cal. Rptr. 853, 855 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1969); cf. Overbreadth Doctrine, supra
note 94, at 889.
173. 9 Cal. 3d 612, 510 P.2d 1017, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1973).
174. Id. at 621, 510 P.2d at 1023, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
175. Cf. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); cf. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
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